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STATE SPEECH AND POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 
ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, 
AND VIRTUES. James E. Fleming1 and Linda C. 
McClain.2 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
2013. Pp. 371. $49.95 (Cloth). 
Abner S. Greeni 
State regulation and state persuasion require different 
grounds of legitimacy. If we understand political liberalism to 
require, among other things, that the state "remain neutral 
toward disputed and controversial ideals of the good life,"4 this 
neutrality should focus on state regulation, not state persuasion. 
Perhaps the state's attempt to regulate based on common 
ground und~rsta~dings (an overlapping consensus of r~as~nable 
comprehensive views of the good} can help secure this kind of 
liberalism in politics. Even when it regulates in this fashion, 
however, the state should attend to the costs imposed on those 
who cannot share in the common ground understanding, or so I 
have argued previously.6 This is so even though the failure of 
neutrality is one of effect and not purpose. Establishment Clause 
limits regarding state religious speech aside (at least in our 
1. The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, Associate 
Dean for Intellectual Life, and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. 
2. Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University 
School of Law. 
3. Leonard F. Manning Professor, Fordham Law School. Thanks to Caroline 
Corbin and Mark Rosen for helpful comments. 
4. CHARLES LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY x (1987). 
5. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
6. See ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF 
AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012); Abner S. Greene, The 
Incommensurability of Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 
(Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000); Abner S. Greene, Constitutional Reductionism, Rawls, 
and the Religion Clauses, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2089 (2004); Abner S. Greene, Kiryas 
Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1996); Abner S. Greene, 
Uncommon Ground: A Review of Political Liberalism by John Rawls and Life's 
Dominion by Ronald Dworkin, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646 (1994); Abner S. Greene, 
The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993). 
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constitutional order), a proper understanding of political 
liberalism need not, though, hem the state in regarding its speech 
power, need not limit it to advancing co1mmon ground 
understandings or liberal conceptions of the good. My prior 
work has argued for a deep and wide pluralism in a liberal 
constitutional order-just as the state should accommodate 
those whose religious and other beliefs and practices cannot be 
part of the regulatory common ground, so should we see the 
"state" as many mini-states (federal, state, local), all competing 
for citizens' allegiance, and able to advance through speech (and 
conditional funding) a wide array of goals, shared and not-so-
shared, liberal and not-so-liberal. Citizens as listeners and voters 
can then make up their own minds. I believe this deep and wide 
pluralism is an aspect of the best understanding of political 
liberalism- a presumptive accommodation of those whose 
practices are harmed by common ground regulation; state 
speech that rna; be on contested issues and may (with some 
possible limits) advance views at odds with standard liberal 
virtues. We should see political liberalism as applying liberal-
ism's open-mindedness, uncertainty, and humility to state action 
generally, acknowledging that viewpoints that reject these 
virtues help provide a check on laws that are otherwise liberal 
(in effect only, perhaps) and on state speech that would 
otherwise advance only standard liberal ends. This marriage of 
pluralism with political liberalism not only provides a checking 
function against the state; it also permits groups to develop apart 
from the state, an important aspect of diversity. Furthermore, it 
is the best way to apply an appropriate liberal sense of doubt 
about whether we've gotten the right or best answers. 
*** 
Jim Fleming and Linda McClain have written an impressive 
book on the responsible exercise of rights, which flows from 
prior writing by each.K Their title, "Ordered Liberty," is a bit of a 
misnomer, however. When one thinks of that phrase, one thinks 
of the ways in which we balance liberty against order, i.e., against 
security, police power, controlling the excesses of liberty. 
Responsibility in the exercise of rights is an aspect of how rights 
7. In addition to Establishment Clause limits on state speech, the Equal Protection 
Clause might best be understood to prevent government from denigrating persons on the 
basis of race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, etc. 
R See JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE 
OF AUTONOMY (2006); LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING 
CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY (2006). 
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are orderly, but the major hard cases involving rights are hard 
because significant claims of harm are in play. Think of much of 
constitutional criminal procedure, free speech cases that are 
tough because speech causes serious harm, not because it does 
not, and abortion rights jurisprudence. Fleming and McClain 
have much to say about what it means to exercise rights 
responsibly, but little to say about the state's claims of order in 
the sense of preventing or redressing serious harm to others. 
A core claim in the book is that encouraging the responsible 
exercise of rights is consistent with a proper understanding of 
liberalism. Liberalism is not, on this view, just about appreciating 
the ways in which the state may be checked and the liberties of 
individuals fleshed out. In addition, it is about the state's 
(including the government, its officials, and persons acting as 
citizens) helping to foster and shape how such liberties are 
understood and employed. One focus of the book is the ways in 
which the state (and civil society) may use its persuasive 
powers-through speech, conditional funding, and the like-to 
"help persons develop their moral capacities for self-government 
and, in that sense, live good lives" (p. 4). Fleming and McClain 
call this "constitutional liberalism," and deem it "a mild form of 
perfectionism" (p. 4). Corey Brettschneider's recent book When 
the State Speaks, What Should It Say?,9 also offers a defense of 
government speech to enhance certain liberal virtues (although 
he might not put it precisely this way). His conception of "value 
democracy"' 0 obligates the state to use its persuasive (but not 
coercive) powers to "transform ... inegalitarian beliefs ... that 
challenge the ideal of free and equal citizenship." 11 
Fleming/McClain and Brettschneider do not offer the same 
government speech agenda-the former focus on autonomy and 
the latter on equality-but both develop a distinctively liberal 
conception of the state's role as persuader. 
In this review, I will discuss two aspects of these arguments 
for government speech. First, I will challenge the claim in both 
books that theirs is a political rather than comprehensive 
liberalism. To some extent, this involves coming to grips with 
Rawls' distinction between these two concepts. But I primarily 
mean to make a conceptual, rather than interpretive claim, i.e., 
9. COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT 
SAY? HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY 
(2012). 
10. /d. at4. 
11. /d. at 89. 
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that the kinds of values, or virtues, that these books say the state 
should foster are based on a distinctive notion of the person and 
of the state's relationship with its citizens, and thus cannot be 
considered simply predicates we must accept for any properly 
working liberal order. Second, I will contend that the state's 
speech power in a liberal democracy should be broader than 
either book suggests. This is consistent with what I believe to be 
a proper political (rather than comprehensive) liberalism. 
Moreover, I mean this second argument, for the scope of 
government speech, to stand whether or not one agrees with my 
treatment of the political versus comprehensive liberalism issue. 
For Fleming and McClain, responsibility in a liberal 
democracy is better seen as "autonomy" than as '·'accountability 
to community'' (p. 3). The state need not be hands off in 
encouraging the responsible exercise of rights (that is a too 
limited understanding of liberalism); but it should foster the 
conditions for, and aid in the exercise of, knowledgeable choice 
among permissible alternatives, rather than steer citizens in one 
direction or another. For example, in the abortion setting, 
Fleming and McClain argue for "encouraging citizens to be 
aware of a range of perspectives" (p. 67), and for "balanced 
counseling encouraging responsible self-determination" (p. 68). 
This role for the state is consistent with a proper constitutional 
liberalism, they argue, which is a version of (their understanding 
of) political liberalism. They make this clear when they critique 
Ronald Dworkin's move to (what they say is) comprehensive 
liberalism (pp. 3-4). And they add: "Our formative project for 
constitutional liberalism is analogous to Rawls's political 
liberalism in maintaining that government should not embrace 
any comprehensive moral doctrine. Nor should government 
attempt to secure agreement upon an orthodoxy concerning the 
best way of life" (p. 118). 
Brettschneider argues for the state to engage in "'democratic 
persuasion," 12 promoting the "ideal of free and equal 
citizenship." 13 This is a political, or public, and not compre-
hensive ideal, he maintains. 14 The state should speak, in various 
ways (including through public education), to preach the core 
values of equal citizenship, and should encourage persons in 
their private capacities to adopt these liberal democratic virtues. 
12. !d. at 4. 
13. !d. at 24. 
14. !d. at 14. 
2013] STATE SPEECH & POLITICAL LIBERALISM 425 
He even extends this latter argument to religious persons and 
institutions: although the state should not use its coercive powers 
to infringe the free exercise of religion, it may encourage 
religions whose beliefs do not accord with our constitutional 
notions of, say, gender equality, to alter their views.'-' His point 
here is not to engage in theological debate or attack religion as 
such, but to include (or fail to exclude) religion in the set of 
beliefs that the state may seek to adjust via its persuasive 
powers. 
I am doubtful that Fleming/McClain and Brettschneider are 
actually offering versions of political rather than comprehensive 
liberalism. The distinction is a matter of both scope and grounds. 
Political liberalism goes to core matters of citizenship only; 
comprehensive liberalism goes more deeply, to touch what we 
would normally consider private matters and issues relating to 
the person apart from his or her role as citizen or official. These 
are matters of scope, and, for the most part, Fleming/McClain 
and Brettschneider limit their arguments to the civic/political 
realm in a way that would justify their claim to be political 
liberals. For example, Fleming and McClain state that "what 
separates perfectionism from political liberalism is that 
perfectionists appeal to furthering human goods, while political 
liberals generally appeal to fostering the preconditions for free 
and equal citizenship and the capacities for democratic and 
personal self-government" (p. 116). Brettschneider says that his 
is an argument about the political realm only, about the proper 
qualities of democratic citizenship. Thus, he refers to his "more 
limited concern with political equality, rather than with equality 
in some more comprehensive sense''' 6 ; he defines "the 
democratic ideal of free and equal citizenship" "in political 
terms, and distinguish[ es] it from more comprehensive notions 
of equality"'7 ; his argument about equality within family life 
"derives from a 'thin' or non-comprehensive conception of free 
and equal citizenship."'x The last quotation reveals something 
true of both books- they discuss family life in a way that extends 
the notion of the political rather deep. Both are aware of this 
and seek to link political understandings of autonomy and 
equality with how life in families potentially prepares one for life 
as a citizen. Thus, in a discussion of civil society that includes 
15. /d. at 143. 
16. /d. at 14. 
17. /d. at 24. 
lR /d. at 54. 
426 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 28:421 
families, Flen1ing and McClain talk about the "liberal 
expectancy of congruence between civil society and 
democracy- that the values cultivated in civil society will be 
liberal democratic values and thus will undergird liberal 
democracy .... [O]ur own account of the roles of civil society 
holds this liberal expectancy" (p. 90). Brettschneider argues, 
similarly, in a discussion that includes family life, that "while a 
commitment to free and equal citizenship only entails endorsing 
a 'thin' set of values, this endorsement potentially challenges the 
comprehensive conceptions of citizens and some practices often 
regarded as private."' Nonetheless, both books hoist the banner 
of political liberalism through arguments that go to what we 
share as citizens. 
But although Fleming/McClain and Brettschneider arguably 
limit the scope of their arguments in a way that is 1::onsistent with 
a political rather than comprehensive liberalism, the values and 
virtues that they defend as appropriate for the state (and all of 
us) to be advocating are contestable and part of some, but not 
other, views of the good life. So, Fleming and McClain focus on 
responsibility "as autonomy" (p. 3). Both the state and civil 
society have a "responsibility to help persons develop their 
moral capacities for self-government and, in that sense, live good 
lives" (p. 4 ). In her prior work, McClain argues sitnilarly that one 
guideline for government persuasion should be: "is government's 
purpose for such persuasive measures to foster the capacity for 
self-government? Is this the likely effect of such measures?"20 
Regarding education, she continues, "Fostering children's 
capacities for self-government should cultivate not only res~ect 
for authority but also autonomy and critical reflection." In 
discussing abortion, Fleming and McClain focus on helping 
citizens become aware of a "range of perspectives," on 
"balanced counseling" (pp. 67-68). Their constitutional 
liberalism "recognizes a proper role for government in helping 
to develop the moral powers (or capacities) of citizens, to 
prepare them for self-governing citizenship" (p. 116). "[W]hat 
separates perfectionism from political liberalism," they argue, "is 
that perfectionists appeal to furthering human goods, while 
political liberals generally appeal to fostering the preconditions 
for free and equal citizenship and the capacities for democratic 
19. /d. at 53. 
20. MCCLAIN, supra note 8, at 46. See id. at 126-27 (government persuasion 
regarding marriage should include autonomy, developing capacity for choice, equality). 
21. /d. at 69. 
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and personal self-government" (p. 116). The "political (or 
public)" values that the state should promote include "the equal 
citizenship of women" (p. 116). Under Fleming and McClain's 
"mild civic liberal perfectionism," "government should 
undertake a formative project of securing the capacities for 
democratic and personal self-government, including cultivating 
the civic virtues necessary for responsible citizenship" (pp. 178-
79). 
Brettschneider focuses on the state's advancing the ideal of 
free and equal citizenship, as speaker, spender, and educator.22 
He accepts that this is not viewpoint neutral, but consistent with 
Supreme Court doctrine allowing deviation from viewpoint 
neutrality if the state is not regulating.23 The state should teach 
civil rights history in a non-neutral way.24 "[P]arental rights do 
not include the ability to raise children free from exposure to the 
ideas fundamental to liberal democracy."25 Accordingly, he 
critiques Wisconsin v. Yoder,26 which interpreted the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to require an 
exemption for the Amish from sending their teenage children to 
any type of school, public or private.27 The state should 
encourage students to reflect and debate, and Brettschneider 
acknowledges this too is not value neutral.2H When it comes to 
state subsidy, he admits that "[v]alue democracy embraces non-
neutral criteria in deciding which groups to fund. "2l) He applies 
all of his arguments to state speech that might affect religious 
belief and practice antithetical to his conception of free and 
equal ci~iz.enship, acceptin~ that his view is .incorvpatible with 
some rehg1ons on the question of exposure to Ideas: 
The conceptions of autonomy, freedom, equality, and open-
mindedness are ones we should share, adopt, and try to persuade 
others to adopt. Were I a government official, I would try to 
promote them (with some caveats that I will mention below). I 
hope I try to live by them and advocate them to my friends. 
But . . . what kinds of ideas are these? Are they somehow 
implicit in a proper understanding of liberal democracy? If they 
22. BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 46. 
23. /d. 
24. /d. at 95. 
25. !d. at 97. 
26. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
27. BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 98-99. 
28. /d. at 101. 
29. /d. at 111. 
30. /d. at 164. 
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are, does that remove then1 from the realm of cornprehensive 
notions of the good? I contend that these are contested, not 
natural, understandings of citizenship; they are part of a specific 
iteration of statehood and statecraft; they are (to some extent, in 
some ways) inconsistent with some fundamentalist religious 
views, and some secular positions on, say, how children should 
be raised and the relationship between men and women. We 
should see these arguments as grounded in a kind of 
comprehensive liberalism; there is no neutral or higher ground 
of argument that can render them arguments from "political" 
liberalism. 
Another way of putting this is that Fleming/McClain and 
Brettschneider are making a kind of "fit" argument, i.e., that the 
values and virtues they are touting (and suggesting the state 
tout) are endogenous and uncontestable terrain of our political 
conception of justice. For example, Brettschneider writes that 
"[c]omprehensive doctrines are those that seek to go beyond a 
theory of what is owed to people by virtue of their common 
status as political beings subject to state power."31 If we want to 
claim that a liberal democracy necessarily contains certain values 
such as equality (as we have come to understand it; both books 
discuss both gender and sexual orientation) and autonomy 
(including getting full knowledge, open-mindedness, having a 
wide range of choices, etc.), we should do so in one of two ways. 
We should acknowledge that we are a comprehensive liberal 
republic, and then think seriously about what that means for 
citizens who adopt different values, i.e., who challenge what we 
see as in1plicit. Or-and better, more accurate, I would suggest-
we should see these values of equality and autonomy as just 
some among many that the state may support, i.e., not as 
endogenous and uncontestable terrain of our political 
conception of justice. Here I share Flemingll\1cClain's and 
Brettschneider's distinction between state regulatory power and 
state speech/funding power. Regarding the former, I share their 
views about the limits on state regulation in the name of a 
proper constitutional conception of equality and autonomy (the 
latter cashing out in various areas, speech, religion, reproductive 
rights, adult sexual choices, etc.) As I have argued elsewhere,32 
the state in a liberal democracy may regulate in these (and 
other) ways, but must be attentive to the cost to those who adopt 
31. /d. at 14. 
32. See supra note 6. 
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different normative views, by providing appropriate exemptions 
and accommodations. Regarding state speech/funding power, 
although my personal preferences are to foster the values and 
virtues that Fleming/McClain and Brettschneider feature (and 
although I would seek to advance such values via speech/funding 
were I in office), a proper political liberalism should be more 
open to the state's advancing a wide range of visions of the good, 
not just ones that fit with a comprehensive liberal understanding 
of citizenship. I will say more about this below. 
I have been suggesting that as a conceptual matter, we 
should understand comprehensive liberalism according to the 
grounds stated for state (and citizen) action, not merely 
according to the scope of application of such grounds. As a 
matter of interp~et.ing .Ra"Yls, this is not an ea~~ issue. To SOJ?e 
extent, Rawls' distinction IS a matter of scope.-- Comprehensive 
moral conceptions apply to "what is of value in human life, and 
ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of 
familial and associational relationships .... "'4 Political moral 
conceptions are "worked out for a specific kind of subject, 
namely, for political, social, and economic institutions."35 The 
content of a political conception of justice is "expressed in terms 
of certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public 
political culture of a democratic society."3h 
On the other hand, the problem Rawls was responding to in 
Political Liberalism was that he came to see some of the 
concepts from A Theory of Justice as grounded in 
comprehensive liberalism, and accordingly okay for ideal theory 
but problematic in terms of actual governance (and legitimacy) 
in a liberal democracy.37 As Samuel Freeman puts it, "The 
problem Rawls ... discovered with official political appeals to 
autonomy [is] familiar. The value of autonomy is part of one or 
more 'comprehensive doctrines' which ... could not be generally 
endorsed by conscientious moral agents, even in a well-ordered 
society where Rawls's own principles of justice are generally 
accepted."3H And Rawls was careful to limit the appropriate 
state-endorsed content of children's education. Let me quote 
33. As he says. See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 13. 
34. !d. 
35. !d. at 11. 
36. !d. at 13. 
37. See id. at Introduction. 
38. Samuel Freeman, Public Reason and Political Justifications. 72 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2021,2025 (2004). 
430 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 28:421 
him at length: 
"[V]arious religious sects oppose the culture of the modern 
world and wish to lead their common life apart from its 
unwanted influences. A problem now arises about their 
children's education and the requirements the state can 
impose. The liberalisms of Kant and Mill may lead to 
requirements designed to foster the values of autonomy and 
individuality as ideals to govern much if not all of life. But 
political liberalism has a different aim and requires far less. It 
will ask that children's education include such things as 
knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights so that, for 
example, they know that liberty of conscience exists in their 
society and that apostasy is not a legal crime, all this to insure 
that their continued membership when they come of age is 
not based simply on ignorance of their basic rights or fear of 
punishment for offenses that do not exist. Moreover, their 
education should also prepare them to be fully cooperating 
members of society and enable them to be self-supporting; it 
should also encourage the political virtues so that they want 
to honor the fair terms of social cooperation in their relations 
with the rest of society. "39 
Although Rawls to some extent focuses on scope in this 
passage, the main point is to clarify that the state in a liberal 
democracy should foster what I would call a fairly thin set of 
virtues, and back off from fostering autonomy and individuality 
in a way that would more deeply cut against the norms of various 
subgroups. Fleming/McClain and Brettschneider advance a view 
of the state's persuasive power that is more grounded in and 
intent on fostering distinctively liberal virtues. 1\fy view about 
the appropriate scope for government speech, about which I will 
say more in a moment, borrows some from Rawls' treatment and 
differs from Fleming/McClain and Brettschneider- I, too, 
believe the state should be cautious about promoting (only) 
distinctively liberal virtues such as autonomy, open-n1indedness, 
equality, and the like. My view then goes on to claim a thicker 
role for government speech, to permit various not-so-liberal 
viewpoints (as well as liberal ones) to be fostered, and to 
encourage the state to provide a seedbed for a wide array of 
viewpoints, some of which may challenge liberal norn1s. 
In earlier writing, I have argued for a robust role for 
government speech.40 The argument differs from Fleming/ 
39. RAWLS, supra note 5, at 199. 
40. See Abner S. Greene, Speech Platforms, 61 CASE WESTERN L. REV. 1253 
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McClain's and Brettschneider's, and differs even if one takes 
their side over mine regarding whether their ideas are truly 
politically liberal. I contend that the state may speak on 
contested issues, even those that do not involve autonomy or 
equality and even to advance positions that a traditionally liberal 
view might abjure. So, for example, I maintain that public high 
schools may choose to teach abstinence-only education, sex 
education, both, or neither. Regardless of my preference were I 
running such a school, I do not believe the state is limited to 
introducing a broad range of perspectives or the perspective that 
might best accord with my preferred version of gender equality. 
(Or my preferred way to ensure against religious norms being 
filtered through the state. On this point: I have argued it is 
unconstitutional for the state to ground coercive law through 
predominant, expressly religious argument.41 The same would go 
for state speech. But laws or persuasive activity that can be 
translated into secular terms are fine, even if the law or speech 
act accords best or most with the views of a particular religion or 
religions.) In earlier work, McClain says that providing sex 
education is part of "government's affirmative responsibility to 
promote responsible self-government and to facilitate the work 
of families in doing so. "42 She adds that it is "not defensible for 
government to seek to advance a conservative sexual economy 
through funding abstinence-only education."43 We should see 
these as comprehensive liberal views on the state's role in 
education, and should prefer a view of state speech that is a 
bigger tent, that permits localities to choose for themselves 
which values involving teenage sexuality to promote via public 
education. 
Here is another example of how I believe a state may speak 
on contested issues: it may say it favors childbirth over abortion 
or that it favors a woman's right to choose between the two. Or 
that it favors neither and expressly wants to remain on the 
sidelines. Although I support the ri~ht of a woman to choose 
whether to carry her child to term, 4 and have serious doubts 
(2011); Abner S. Greene, Government Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1667 (2001 ); Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1 
(2000). 
41. See GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 6, at 150-55; Greene, The 
Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, supra note 6, at 1614-33. 
42. MCCLAIN, supra note 8, at 257. 
43. /d. at 276. 
44. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973). 
432 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 28:421 
about the outcome of the abortion-counseling gag rule case, Rust 
v. Sullivan,45 in general abortion should be an area in which the 
state may take sides, if it wants, via its persuasive powers. My 
doubts about Rust go to the setting in which the speech is taking 
place (doctor's offices). My argument for state speech requires 
that it be neither monopolistic nor coercive,46 and telling poor 
women who come to Title X clinics that they n1ay carry their 
fetuses to term, while telling them nothing a bout abortion 
alternatives even if they ask, risks rendering their ultimate 
choices not fully knowing, and thus even if not strictly speaking 
coerced, still constitutionally problematic. Brettschneider 
disagrees on my main point here, contending that "[t]he decision 
of individuals regarding abortion is in the realm of 
comprehensive conceptions of the good, and thus falls beyond 
the scope of democratic persuasion."47 But the state's advancing 
its position in a contested arena, where some (not all) citizens 
will ground their views in comprehensive conceptions of the 
good, does not infringe liberty, because it is not regulatory. Were 
the state required to advance just one view (say, the one that 
best promotes women's equality) it would be, on my argument, 
itself forced to advance a comprehensive liberalism. Better to 
see the state as a participant in an active speech market, where 
citizens can then make up their own minds. This notion of 
listener autonomy is a key predicate to our free speech 
jurisprudence generally, and helps undergird a n1ore capacious 
understanding of state speech.4K 
Brettschneider's argument for the state's being hands-off· 
regarding persuasion in the abortion setting sten1s from his 
broader claim: "I do not suggest that the government should 
mold opinion on matters about which there is reasonable 
disagreement.""!'! In her prior work, McClain argued similarly: it 
is "inappropriate for government to promote an orthodox~ 
concerning what views citizens should hold about a good life." 0 
Let's put aside that there is disagreement about some of the 
virtues that Brettschneider (and Fleming/McClain) would ask 
the state to promote (this would require a discussion of the 
"reasonable" and would lead us back to my clailn that their view 
45. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
46. See Greene. Government of the Good, supra note 40, at 26-49. 
47. BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 123. 
4X. See Greene. Government of the Good, supra note 40, at 25-26. See also 
BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at n6, XR. 
49. BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 39. 
50. McCLAIN, supra note R, at 48. 
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of what is implicit in liberal democracy may well be contested51 ). 
The state may play a broader role. So long as it reveals itself as 
speaker (to avoid ventriloquism52) and is neither coercive nor a 
monopolist in the relevant speech market, the state may advance 
what a majority believes to be true or good, leaving it to citizens 
to decide in contested arenas. For an example of how we differ 
here: Brettschneider says that because disagreement about 
affirmative action is reasonable and an understanding of free 
and equal citizenship doesn't require one answer, the issue is 
thus "not subject to democratic persuasion. "53 I say that state 
actors and jurisdictions may differ in their views about 
affirmative action, and may seek to persuade citizens of one 
position over the other. The sum total of diverse views here, and 
elsewhere, supports a true political liberalism, open-minded at a 
meta-level toward what may be good. 
51. See GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION, supra note 6. at 56-63, 101-07. 
52. See Greene, Government of the Good, supra note 40. at 49-52. 
53. BRETTSCHNEIDER. supra note 9, at 90. 
